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TRUS'l'-The

complaint alleged that testatµx who had executed a will leaving her whole
estate to defendants attempted to make a new will containing legacies to plaintiffs,
but that by means of llllsrepresentations, undue influence, force, and murder,
testatrix was prevented by defendants from signing the new will. On appeal
from dismissal of the complaint for insufficiency, held, reversed. If the allega-
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tions of the complaint be taken as true, plaintiffs are entitled to a judicial
declaration that defendants hold the property under a constructive trust for
plaintiffs. Latham v. Father Divine, 299 N.Y. 22, 85 N.E. (2d) 168 (1949).
Courts of equity have long thought it proper to impose a constructive trust
on a distributee or legatee where the execution or revocation of the will has been
induced or prevented by force, fraud, or undue inHuence.1 The general rule with
respect to revocations is that, despite the wrong, the testacy or intestacy of the
decedent is nevertheless his legal wish subject to an· equity.2 Invariably, however, the courts have directed their attention exclusively to the unjust enrichment
of the defendant and have neglected entirely the plaintiff's equities, resting their
decisions on the maxim "that no one may profit from his own wrong." The
courts' willingness to impose a constructive trust has been affected by such factors
as: (1) whether the defendant or a third person was guilty of the fraud, 3 (2) whether or not the defendant was an heir or distributee, and (3) the Hagitiousness of
the defendant's misconduct. The courts and the text writers have been concerned
with a conHict of policies between complying with the Statute of Wills on the
one hand and denying the defendant unjust enrichment on the other,4 yet
there is the equally well-recognized principle that the plaintiff is not entitled
to more relief than is necessary to make him whole. Both the defendant, as
distributee or legatee, and the plaintiff, as disappointed distributee or intended
legatee, had mere expectancies. To permit full recovery by means of a constructive trust where the interest invaded is only in expectancy seems as inaccurate
as to deny recovery altogether. If the decedent was advanced in age, near death,
and not in the habit of changing his will, the value of the expectancy would be
much greater than if he were young and his will subject to frequent change
during his lifetime. And if the defendant's misconduct was merely temporary,
the decedent might have expressed his true intent after it ceased; therefore, it
is much less the proximate cause of the loss of the plaintiff's expectancy than if
it continued until the decedent's death. Where, as in tlie principal case, the
defendant's misconduct causes or continues until the decedent's death, the
damages equal the full value of the expectancy, but theoretically the expectancy
never equals the full amount of the legacy until it has become a vested right by
l Marriot v. Marriot, I Strange 666, 93 Eng. Rep. 770 (I 725); Dixon v. Olmius, I Cox
Ch. Cas. 414, 29 Eng. Rep. 1227 (1787); Luttrell v. Waltham, cited with approval by Lord
Eldon•in Mestaer v. Gillespie, 11 Ves. Jr. 622 at 638, 32 Eng. Rep. 1230 at 1236 (1805);
Gains v. Gains, 2 A. K. Marsh (Ky.) 190, 12 Am. Dec. 375 (1820) (dictum); Bulkley v.
Wilford, 8 Bligh (N.S.) Ill, 2 Cl. & Fin. 102, 6 Eng. Rep. 1094 (1834); Blanchard v.
Blanchard, 32 Vt. 62 (1859) (dictum); Brazil v. Silva, 181 Cal. 490, 185 P. 174 (1919);
Seeds v. Seeds, 116 Ohio St. 144, 156 N.E. 193 (1927); and see 98 A.L.R. 474 (1935);
RESTITOTioN REsTATBMENT §184 (1937) comment i, in particular, as applied to the facts
of the principal case; I PAGB, WILLS §448 (1941); Contra: Kent v. Mahaffey, 10 Ohio St.
204 (1859); Bohleber v. Rebstock, 255 ill. 53, 99 N.E. 75 (1912).
2 REsnTUTioN REsTATBMENT §184 (1937); !'PERRY, TRUSTS AND TRusTBEs §182
(1929); 68 C.J. 824, Wills §529 (1934). The same rule should apply to original wills wrongfully induced but such has not always been the case. Warren, "Fraud, Undue Influence, and .
Mistake in Wills," 41 HARv. L. RBv. 309 at 313 (1928).
3 Kent v. Mahaffey, supra, note 3; Dye v. Parker, 108 Kan. 304, 194 P. 640, 195 P. 599
(1921).
4 3 Scon, TRusTs §489.6 (1939).
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the decedent's death. The damages, therefore, can never equal the legacy except
where the misconduct has occurred after the decedent's death as in the suppression
of a will. If the plaintiff is to be recompensed only to the amount his expectancy
has been diminished, 5 then it ii necessary to scale the relief, a result which
cannot be achieved in equity with a constructive trust but which can be accomplished easily at law in a tort action for damages. The obstacle encountered by
such a procedure is that a reasonable expectancy of this kind has not always been
regarded as a substantive right capable of being invaded. 6 Never:theless, the
courts, with the approval of text writers,7 have permitted recovery in analogous
situations8 under the doctrine of Lumley v. Gye9 even where the damages have
been almost incapable of evaluation. 10 Argument can be made that the doctrine
should be extended to the field of testamentary transactions11 and, indeed, there
has been such a tendency in a few jurisdictions,12 but the difficulty of evaluating
the damages makes it doubtful whether a greater degr~e of accuracy is assured
than by imposing a constructive trust for the entire legacy. There still remains
the problem of the defendant's unjust enrichment but he, too, had an expectancy
though admittedly not as valuable as the plaintiff's; therefore, if the residue is
considered to be the value of this expectancy, then there is no unjust enrichment.
No precedent for a damage action seems to have been established in New York, 13
however, and the court in the principal case, which under the Code was at
liberty to find sufficient facts stating a cause of action either at law or in equity,
evidently preferred to impose a constructive trust rather than to deny relief
altogether.14
John S. Yates
5 Note that if the misconduct is only temporary, it causes the expectancy to be diminished, whereas if it continues until the decedent's death, it causes the expectancy to be lost.
6 Hutchins v. Hutchins, 7 Hill 104 (N.Y. 1845); Simar v. Canaday, 53 N.Y. 298, 13
Am. Rep. 523 (1873); 2 BoHLEN, CASES ON ToRTS 1186 (1915) (footnote). This was
said to be damnum absque injuria.
7Terry, "Malicious Torts," 20 L.Q. REv. 10 at 15 (1904); and see note, 48 HARV. L.
REv. 984 (1935).
.
s Wilful destruction of plaintiff's reasonable expectancy of earning a livelihood, e.g.,
preventing formation of contracts with third persons, injuring his business by conduct not
involving defamatory statements, frightening away game he might have taken, making more
onerous his performance of contracts with third persons, inducing breach of contract which
was terminable at will or unenforceable because of infancy or Statute of Frauds; and also
where "special damages" were sought in slander actions for defamatory words not actionable
per se including injuries for loss of expected gratuity, prospective marriage, and future economic gain. For specific cases and citations, see note, 48 HAnv. L. REv. 984 (1935).
o 2 E. & B. 216 (Q.B.) 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853).
10 Chaplin v. Hicks, [1911] 2 K.B. 786.
11 Evans, "Torts to Expectancies in Decedents' Estates," 93 Umv. PA. L. REv. 187 at
193 and 196 (1944).
12 Kelly v. Kelly, 10 La. Ann. 622 (1855); Lewis v. Corbin, 195 Mass. 520, 81 N.E.
248 (1907); Bohannon v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 210 N.C. 679, 188 S.E. 390 (1936);
3 ScOTT, TRUSTS §489.4 (1939). No support, however, is found for this view in the REsnTUTION RESTATEMENT.
13 In fact Hutchins v. Hutchins, supra, note 6, is good authority to the contrary, but it
is interesting to note that this case was decided before Lumley v. Gye.
14 For an analysis of the constructive trust aspects of the principal case, see Professor
Scott's note, 63 HARv. L. REv. 108 (1949).

